Ronald Reagan was inaugurated as the 40th president of the United States on January 20. Like other American chief executives of recent years, Ronald Reagan has frequently attested that he would not desert old friends to make new ones.
But there is a difference in President Reagan's pledge. He means it now and tomorrow, figuratively and literally. He is a man of his word. His loyalties to friends are not subject to changes in the conditions surrounding the friendship. During the presidential campaign of 1980, Mr. Reagan repeated his support of the Republic of China, although some of his aides are said to have suggested that he soft-pedal discussion of Chinese recognition questions.
During a lifetime in politics, the labor movement and the entertainment industry, President Reagan has opposed Communism. This inevitably led him toward a close relationship with the Republic of China and to respect and admiration for the late President Chiang Kai-shek, the greatest anti-Communist fighter of this century.
When Jimmy Carter recognized the Chinese Communists and derecognized the Republic of China, Ronald Reagan said flatly that Mr. Carter had made an unfortunate mistake. Mr. Reagan said at that time: "I call upon President Carter to come forth and tell the American people precisely and concretely which measures the government will take in order to assure the safety and well-being of the 17 million people of Taiwan. We don't need platitudes or vague expressions of our hopes for Taiwan. We do need concrete assurances. If we do not provide these, we will have taken the first step in directly violating the human rights of the people of Taiwan. Americans have welcomed improved friendship with the people of mainland China in recent years. But this sudden action raises the stark question: What did we get that we did not already have; and what was the urgency in doing it now?"
Since assuming the presidency, Mr. Reagan presumably has not had time to examine China policy in detail. He has been busy organizing his administration, getting the hostages home and attacking economic problems. He will get around to China in time, however, and when he does he will have guidelines laid down in his most definitive expression on the subject, an address made on July 17, 1978, to the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association and the Committee to Conserve Chinese Culture in Los Angeles. These are some of the points Mr. Reagan made at that time and which he has given no slightest sign of watering down:
—An impression (gained from an April, 1978, visit) that the Republic of China is one of the world's greatest success stories and a marked contrast to the poverty and tyranny of the Chinese mainland under Communism.
—Americans are steadfastly opposed to the recognition of the Chinese Communists at the expense of the Republic of China.
—There is no "Red China card" to be played against the Soviet Union.
—Peiping's clear intention is to seize Taiwan by force.
—All objective and subjective arguments for "normalization of relations" with the Chinese Communists on Chinese Communist terms were without validity.
—Friendship with the "people of the Chinese mainland" can be pursued without jeopardizing the U.S. relationship with the Republic of China.
—The Shanghai Communique said that the Chinese should settle the Chinese problem. Why should the United States attempt to play a role in that process through "normalization" of relations with Red China.
That address of nearly three years ago can be expected to provide the groundwork for President Reagan's China policy when the time comes to enunciate it anew. Following is the record of what Mr. Reagan had to say in his most complete and extended remarks on China and regarding his convictions about the Republic of China:
Though I know you didn't invite me here to give you a travelogue—and I didn't bring any colored slides—I do want to share with you some of my impressions of Taiwan from our visit there in April (1978). It was our first since 1971, and the changes—the growth and progress—were very impressive.
Everywhere we went on Taiwan we saw the evidence of a vigorous and successful society. The people have planned well and are building for a future based on industrialization and increasingly advanced technology. No wonder the Republic of China has one of the highest standards of living in Asia and, on a per capita basis, does even more trade with us than Japan.
We visited the ultramodern steel plant and the great new shipyard at Kaohsiung. On the flight down we followed the route of the new north-south superhighway, a highway that would make any California motorist feel right at home.
In Taipei we found a city that seems almost to have built anew since our last visit.
One of the things that struck me most was that the people of Taiwan smile so much. Perhaps that is because they have built a society where they are free to work toward fulfilling the goals they have set for themselves; they are free to pursue advanced education; and to practice their religious convictions.
Theirs is a society where the free market system thrives; where imagination and creativity are rewarded; where family values endure and where Chinese culture, which has contributed so much to world civilization, has been nurtured. Sadly, during many of the same years that the Chinese on Taiwan have been the principal conservators of Chinese culture, their countrymen on the mainland have found the richness of that traditional culture either denied them or attacked for political purposes.
There are many sharp contrasts between the mainland of China and Taiwan, of course. We see it also in world trade. For example, United States trade with the Republic of China amounted to nearly $6 billion last year (1977), compared with only a little over $300 million with the mainland. Yet, the mainland has nearly 900 million inhabitants compared to Taiwan's 17 million.
The American view of China today might be likened to a gemstone that is held to the light. If you turn it one way, it reflects the light in a certain way. But turn it, and the light is reflected elsewhere.
Time and again, when the average American is asked his opinion of our relations with China, he responds by saying yes, he would like to have so-called "normal" relations with the mainland. But turn the question and you get a much different reflection of opinion. When the question becomes, would you be willing to "normalize" relations with Peking at the expense of the Republic of China?—then the average American answers with an emphatic "No."
Recently, U.S. News & World Report published a nationwide poll it had commissioned. In answer to the statement, "The U.S. should recognize mainland China and give up recognition of Taiwan", a majority close to two-thirds—58 per cent to be exact—said "No". Only 20 per cent said "Yes". Another 22 per cent said they had "no opinion". This latter group may reflect some of the confusion that has been created in the United States by those who have been pressing for immediate "normalization" of relations with Peking.
The "normalization-now" view is articulated frequently by a few U.S. scholars and they are sometimes believed to represent most intellectual thought on the subject. But they don't. A study done recently by a research group at Brown University revealed that a cross-section of intellectuals and other opinion leaders hold similar views to the general public on the "normalization" issue, but actually hold them more strongly.
For example, 72 per cent of the 1,800 leaders surveyed believe that unilateral U.S. derecognition of the Republic of China and disengagement for our security relationship with Taiwan would hurt U.S. leadership and credibility in Asia. An even higher number, 93 per cent, believe that the United States should not accept Peking's three conditions in order to achieve "normalization."
Among those surveyed by the Brown University research team were members of the United States Congress, members of the national committees of our two big political parties, state governors and state legislative and political leaders, newspaper and television executives and editors.
Still, we must not underestimate the influence of that relatively small number of American scholars and commentators which is pressing the normalization issue essentially on Peking's terms. They are widely published and quoted in newspapers and magazines and they have some adherents in the government.
I have read their arguments many times. These arguments contain a built-in contradiction. On the one hand, they say that Peking sees Moscow as the greatest threat to world peace today and that we must take advantage of this to make an alliance that will inhibit the Soviet Union from expanding its influence and provoking conflict. Yet, they also argue that unless the United States rushes to "normalize" its relations with Peking, the leadership there will suddenly drop us and embrace Moscow in a new alliance which would have ominous overtones for America's future security.
In addition to that contradiction, there is an odd quality to their discussion of Taiwan in the arguments they put forth. They talk of Taiwan as if it were something abstract and not a real place populated by 17 million real people who want nothing more nor less than to be free to determine their own destiny.
Those who argue for normalization also contend that if Peking would only give quiet assurances that it would not attempt a military conquest of Taiwan in exchange for "normalization," then Taiwan's security would be assured. Peking's answer to this has been echoed time and again by its leaders. They insist that once "normalization" is achieved what they do about Taiwan is nobody else's business.
Though this line of reasoning is hardly reassuring, there is a certain logic to it. The American declaration in the Shanghai Communique of 1972 contained these lines: "The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China."
So, if the United States, in order to "normalize" relations with Peking, were to accede to its three demands—breaking diplomatic relations with the Republic of China, breaking our mutual defense treaty of 1954 and withdrawing our remaining military advisers—then Peking could indeed argue, with some logic, that Taiwan and thus all of its people had become an internal matter and no longer any of America's business. But, in order for all that to happen, the United States would have to agree to the three demands and, as I have said, the great majority of the American people and most opinion leaders do not want that to happen.
Those who argue for "normalization" focus their attention on finding some supposed "formula" for preventing military takeover of Taiwan by Peking's forces. But they forget that there is more than one way to wage war. One need not necessarily drop bombs or shoot cannons. Economic warfare can be just as real and just as devastating. What assurance would there be, if the United States did agree to the three demands, that Peking would not use economic weapons to bring Communist control to Taiwan?
Those Americans who put forth the so-called "Japanese formula" as an answer forget that the Japanese formula was made possible because Japan had no mutual security treaty with the Republic of China and because it was known the United States would continue its close security ties with the Republic of China. With South Korea, Japan and Taiwan—all in alliance with the United States—forming a security shield in the Western Pacific, maintenance of Japan's economic relationship with Taiwan continued to be possible while it also developed a major economic relationship with the mainland. There was, in effect, no price to pay for the formula.
For the United States there would be a serious price, for its reliability as leader of the non-Communist world and as an ally would be called into question. As we have seen, the American people continue to express their strong belief that abandoning a good friend and ally to an unknown fate in order to "normalize" relations with Peking is not worth the price of America's credibility. Indeed, when friends of the United States have already had reason in recent years to question America's reliability as a friend, the act of breaking a treaty without due cause would hardly be reassuring to our other allies.
The advocates of "normalization" tend, also, to forget that the Shanghai Communique itself does not have the force of a treaty. It was simply a declaration of intent and a description of things as they were by the leaders of two governments at the time. Those two leaders do not govern today.
Senator Jacob Javits of New York made the point when he was in Taipei last December (1977) that the United States should look upon South Korea, Japan and the Republic of China as its Western frontier, just as it considers Europe as its Eastern frontier. He said that encouragement of lateral support between South Korea, Japan and the Republic of China "does not represent anything unfriendly" to either Peking or Moscow. I think it is a good point. In fact, such encouragement would tend to clarify once and for all the United States' own definition of its security interests and would have the helpful effect of not allowing false impressions to develop in the area of detente.
All of this is not to say that America's friendship with the people of the Chinese mainland cannot be developed with care, but this can be done only if it does not jeopardize our close friendship with the Chinese on Taiwan. The tradition of friendship of the American people with the Chinese people is a long one and many individual Americans are desirous of visiting the mainland while others want to develop more trade. Such things need not be inconsistent with the present strong ties we have with the Republic of China.
Just the same, when it comes to the mainland, we must proceed with our eyes open. For example, much news has emanated from the mainland in recent weeks about a so-called "liberalization" of conditions for the people there. We hear about churches being allowed to reopen; about some of the young people who had been forced to move from the cities to the countryside being allowed to return. We hear about overseas Chinese being allowed to visit the mainland more easily than before in order to be reunited with family members and old friends. We even hear that Peking is encouraging some kinds of criticism of officialdom.
All of this may be well and good—if it is true. But, considering the past human rights record on the mainland, I think we should keep in mind that old Missouri expression, "Show me".
For a long time, the Republic of China has been showing us how well its society works. Hundreds of thousands of visitors come and go at will every year. People there work and live where they wish. They worship as they wish and they participate actively in the process of government.
As to the mainland, I think the American people will continue to say "Show me" for some time to come.
In fact, one wonders just how deep the commitment to the liberalization of human rights really is in Peking when the declaration is made, as it was at the "National People's Congress" in late February that "The Chinese People's Liberation Army must make all the preparations necessary for the liberation of Taiwan." Does that suggest peaceful intentions? One must wonder also about the quality of life on the mainland when several thousand of its citizens risk their lives each year to escape across the border into Hongkong.
And, one must wonder, when looking back over the severe repressions of the people of the mainland for so many years, whether the recent talk of liberalization of policies describes a situation that is more apparent than real.
That is a question that only time can answer. And, speaking of time, time itself is a factor in the American dilemma over China. We Americans like to think of ourselves as problem-solvers. Historically, I think it has been one of our greatest strengths, for it has permitted us to solve very great technical, scientific and engineering problems over the years. But, there is an opposite side to that coin. It is that we are also an impatient people. We do not like to see problems left unsolved. We are restless until we have disposed of them. In fact, we sometimes rush toward what we think is a solution only to find out later that the "solution" turns out to be a new set of problems. Often, our elected representatives will see a problem and, with good intentions, rush through legislation to cure it, only to discover later that the cure was worse than the "disease". Sometimes they even find cures for which there are no known diseases. We know that we are impatient, but we do not change. That seems to be a fact of human nature a reality we must deal with. I think it explains in part why the advocates of "normalization" are so anxious to complete the process. It may just be a case of native American restlessness. Ironically, these same "normalization" advocates often cite impatience by Peking as a reason for going ahead. They suggest that if we don't hurry, our present level of friendship with the mainland will deteriorate and Peking will rush into the arms of Moscow. But, if that were to happen, it would be because Peking had decided it was in its own self-interest to do so. And any government that acted with such calculating pragmatism might be just as likely to throw over an alliance with the United States at some future date if it felt it was in its best interests to do so.
By the way, these same China "experts" two years ago warned that if we did not "normalize" at once, we would lose our chance after Mao Tse-tung died. Well, Mao died and the sky didn't fall.
This argument of the "normalization" advocates is self-defeating. Furthermore, there is no outward evidence from the mainland that it foresees an immediate detente with the Soviet Union. On the contrary, Peking's leaders echo and re-echo the theme that the Soviet Union poses the greatest threat to world peace today and that the United States is, to them, a "lesser evil". Certainly, the presence of nearly a million Soviet troops in the vicinity of the Chinese border must give Peking ample cause to worry about Russian intentions.
Mr. Brzezinski is impatient to "play the China card" as the saying goes, hoping to use a Washington-Peking alliance as leverage against the Russians. That could be a very risky business. At the least it might prompt the Russians to insist on concessions in arms negotiations, on the grounds that the United States and the Chinese Communists were playing two-against-one. At the worst it might provoke the Soviet Union into striking out against China.
Michael Ledeen of the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies has recently put forth a plausible case for the idea that the Russians, while they are still way ahead of the Chinese Communists in military strength, might launch a strike against Sinkiang Province, destroy the Chinese nuclear facilities there, cripple airfields and other munitions plants throughout the country and support a so-called Turkestan People's war of liberation. Two of the objectives, Mr. Ledeen says, would be to show the world the Soviet Union's unchallenged might and to destroy the Chinese Communists' military capability before the country can fully industrialize.
If we had an alliance with the Communist regime in Peking, such a situation would present us with very grim alternatives. If we moved to help them, we might be drawn into direct confrontation with the Russians. If we failed to respond, it would show the Russians—and the world—that they can do as they wish virtually anywhere.
But let me return to this impatience which the American "normalization" advocates ascribe to Peking. Because impatience is an American characteristic, it is perhaps natural for us to attribute the same characteristic to others. Yet, the very opposite is true in this case. Chinese people are known for patience rather than impatience. And, when Peking sends signals to us that is growing impatient over the failure for "normalization" to proceed I suspect it may be they are using "reverse" psychology on us.
If ever there was a case where patience is called for—as well as the passage of time—it is in this matter of U.S.-Chinese relationships.
After all, in the Shanghai Communique we said that matters regarding Taiwan were to be settled by the Chinese people themselves. This requires the passage of time. Any impatience by the United States to conclude this matter now can only bring about what amounts to an imposed settlement, for if we were to complete "normalization" under the conditions Peking has set down, we would, in effect, seal the fate of Taiwan and the Republic of China. It is hard for me to believe that any sensible American who believes in individual liberty and self-determination would stand by and let his government abandon an ally whose only "sins" are that it is small and loves freedom.
The days ahead will not be easy ones for our friends on Taiwan. In my opinion the realities of American politics are such that the Administration would not be persuaded to move much closer toward so-called "normalization" before this year's (1978's) elections. After all, elected representatives do not like to have to answer for unpopular policies. Depending upon the outcome of that election, though, I think we can expect the advocates of "normalization" to begin raising the same arguments again next year that they raised before, with an even greater sense of urgency and restlessness than they are now.
Those of you here, all friends of Free China, know that one of the best guarantees of maintaining our current close ties with Taiwan rests with your ability to communicate your views to your elected representatives and to get your friends and neighbors to do so, too. Another is the closeness of the business and trade ties we have developed with Taiwan. These have led to deep, long-lasting personal friendships, and both the trade and personal ties have stood as a bulwark against sudden changes in the relationship between the United States and the Republic of China. It is our turn now—the turn of the American people—to show just how strong those bonds of friendship really are.